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DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERSIFICATION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING
Ralph F. Fuchs*
"Nat" Nathanson, as his colleagues and contemporaries affectionately call him, has contributed effectively to an understanding of, among
others, two aspects of administrative law which are increasingly being
recognized as of exceptional significance: the development of policy by
administrative agencies and the use of rule making as an administrative
device. 1 The two have frequently been linked together in practice, even
though each can operate without significant connection to the other, as
occurs, for example, when policy is shaped by action upon applications
for certificates of convenience and necessity and when rule making takes
place for the purpose of prescribing agency routines involving only
secondary policy aspects relating to official convenience and the routines
of service to the. public. The purpose of this essay, written as a heartfelt
tribute to Nat, is to call attention to several processes of government
policy making that serve many goals and to discuss the ways in which
they are carried on in several kinds of rule making by administrative
agencies, particularly in the federal government.
PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICY MAKING

It is useful here to identify three processes by which governmental
policy making may go forward and which are, or may be, employed in
varying combinations by administrative agencies in much of the rule
making they conduct. To indicate their nature, the three processes can be
called the political, the investigational and the auditory.2 The political
*

University Professor of Law Emeritus, Indiana University at Bloomington.

I See, e.g., Hyman & Nathanson, JudicialReview of Price Control: The Battle of the

Meat Regulations, 42 ILL. L. REV. 584 (1947); Nathanson, Probingthe Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative
ProcedureAct and Other FederalStatutes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Nathanson]; Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3
VAND. L. REV. 470, 481-92 (1950).
2 This classification is a modification of the one set forth in Fuchs, Procedurein AdministrativeRule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259 (1938). There the focus was on the mechanics of
agency rule-making procedures; here it is on the methods by which policy is determined, to
which the procedures give varying form and scope. Concerning the interplay of processes
and forces which determines policies at all levels of government, see C. LINDBLOM, THE
POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (1968). See also Jaffe, The Illusion of the IdealAdministration, 86
MARV. L. REV. 1183 (1973); the contributions in The Government as Regulator,400 ANNALS
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process involves an interchange of information and views among persons
in government and people in the relevant community whose interests,
perceptions and desires are supposed to enter into the determinations to
be made. The investigational approach to policy making, frequently used
by experts, requires examination and evaluation of available relevant
data, including viewpoints, gathered in numerous appropriate ways, by
decision makers. The precise investigational methods employed should3
be those appropriate to the subject matter involved. The auditory process
requires the presentation of information and argument to a determining
authority in structured proceedings.
The extent to which each process is employed in particular poli~ymaking operations of government determines to a large extent the structure, composition and procedures of the governmental bodies that carry
on those operations. Obviously, the legislature employs largely the political process, as does the executive in many matters; the executive branch
contains officials and agencies that rely heavily on investigational techniques in the solution of policy problems; and the judiciary primarily uses
auditory processes. The characteristics of the three departments differ
accordingly; but there are common elements because each branch uses
each of the three processes to some extent.
In a democracy the highest policy-making function, aside from
constitutional change, resides in an elected legislature and in a chief
executive chosen directly or indirectly by the people and responsible to
them. The representative character of the legislature introduces directly
into the policy-making operation the diverse knowledge, interests and
views of the constituencies, derived from the representatives' interchanges with members of those constituencies. The representatives armed4
with this information interact through formal parliamentary proceedings,
supplemented by informal negotiation off the floor. 5 From this combinaix-139 (1972); and the observations of Emmette S. Redford in his books which are considered together in Fuchs, Book Review, 49 TEX. L. REv. 204 (1970).
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972), discusses illuminatingly
the interrelations of subject matter, social pressures and procedural alternatives in determining the processes, particularly the policy-making processes, which do and should prevail
in administrative agencies. As to practical applications in relation to earlier forms of
regulation, see W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES (1967); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

233-512 (1958); W.

GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS 41-74, 116-44 (1941).
3 The term "auditory" is not wholly satisfactory, but a better alternative has not been
found. "Forensic," which might be accurate, has too many alternative meanings; "adjudicatory" relates too often to determinations in which the policy element is lacking or is of
minor concern; "trial-type" focuses attention too largely on fact ascertainment; and "quasijudicial" is both vague and too strongly evocative of the image of courts alone.
4 See generally Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 195 (1976).
5 As to the element of negotiation in legislation, see Eisenberg, PrivateOrderingThrough
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rule Making, 89 HARV. L. REv. 637, 665-66 (1976).
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tion of exchanges, legislative decisions in a democracy are made in basic
instances. Executive decision making accompanied by consultation with
interested persons has some of the same elements.
Even in the legislature, however, the political process generally does
not function by itself. Especially through committee studies, hearings
and staff advice, knowledge derived from investigatory processes is
assembled and brought to bear on the legislative process. In addition, the
legislature sometimes passes judgment in its enactments on the contentions of rival constituent groups that assume the initiative, in a manner
which has been likened to adjudication. 6 Perhaps more frequently, committee hearings at which information and opinion are adduced in an
orderly manner and placed on record possess some of the attributes of
an auditory proceeding on which the legislative outcome may in part be
based. Expanding legislative and committee staffs attest to the growing
infusion of expertness, of episodic and continuing inquiries and of
structured hearing procedures into modem legislative processes, to supplement the dominant political element. To an even greater extent in the
processes employed by executive officials, the advice of departmental
staffs enters in, often reflecting information and views which have been
assembled through investigations and hearings.
On the part of the courts, the policy-making function is incidental to
the decision of cases and is largely based on structured auditory proceedings at which evidence and argument are adduced; but here also a
combination of processes enters at times. Experts may give testimony
reflecting their accumulated knowledge or special studies; and the judge
himself may take judicial notice of sufficiently authenticated information
which has not been introduced in evidence. The sentencing function in
criminal cases, performed mainly by judges, has long been unstructured
and in modern times has taken into account information and appraisal
made available by specialized staff members. Also influential with judges
to an uncertain extent are community pressures based on attitudes toward
particular offenders or offenses or toward law enforcement in general.
Finally, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions and statutes by
courts, public opinion, which exerts pressures outside the structured
judicial processes, may play a role.
Much of the infusion of investigative and auditory aspects into
legislative proceedings and executive political activities and of expertness
and politics into judicial processes is unplanned, that is, responsive to the
inescapable requirements of the tasks to be performed. Some of the
mixture arises, however, from deliberate specification, such as statutory
provisions which make the services of probation staffs available to judges
or require that budget plans or economic advice, prepared by specialists,
be made available to the executive and the legislature.
6 J. CHAMBERLAIN, LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

4-5 (1936).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In the specialized administrative agencies, the prevalent combinations of policy-making processes result from deliberate statutory prescription which imparts a unique character to these agencies. They are to make
policy-albeit subordinate policy-reflecting the same community forces
as shape the governing statutes, but often after channeling these forces
through structured proceedings. At the same time, they must use agency
information and expert judgment derived from continuing or special
inquiries, which are often required to be stated openly in auditory proceedings, before authoritative action can be taken. The purposes of this
combination of processes are to secure the informed effectuation of
legislatively determined basic policies, to assure fair consideration of the
specific interests which are at stake in the determinations to be made, and
7
to facilitate later scrutiny of the results.
Linked to these intra-agency processes of the specialized agencies is
judicial review of agency action, which usually is available to help keep
that action true to the prescriptions laid down for it. In some instances
formalized review by the legislature or its agents may also take place. 8
Varying forms of oversight of or prescription to agencies by the chief
executive may also be appropriate from time to time. 9 By these various
7 As to relevant distinctions between legislative and agency processes which may render
concerted private efforts to influence the latter violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), even though similar attempts to influence the former could not
constitutionally be forbidden, see California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972). The agency action which it was sought to influence there did not involve
rule making, but the Court noted generally that immunity from illegality would attach to
concerted activity, not constituting a "mere sham" for an illegal purpose, which used "the
channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes
and points of view .... " Id. at 510-Il. Inferentially, conduct outside those channels and
procedures can be regulated in ways that conduct within them cannot be. There are also,
however, more limited forms of conduct toward legislators, such as bribery, which fall
outside legitimate channels of influencing legislation and can be forbidden.
8 As to statutory requirements for the "laying" of executive or administrative regulations
or other actions before legislatures prior to their effectiveness, accompanied by readier
means of disapproval than the enactment of countervailing statutes, see, e.g., the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (Supp. V 1975), which applies
to presidential actions under several other statutory provisions authorizing disapproval of
these actions by either house of Congress within 15 days. For other examples and a
discussion of the doubtful constitutionality of such legislative veto devices, see 1976
Bicentennial Institute, Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 AD. L. REv.
569, 681-701 (1976); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953).
9 Submission of agency regulations to the governor or attorney general or both for
approval or disapproval prior to effectiveness, is required by some state administrative
procedure legislation. Presidential directives to federal agencies, designed to affect future
weighing of policies on their part, are issued occasionally. See, e.g., Exec. Order No.
11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974), relating to inflationary impact statements in connection
with certain agency actions. Binding directives as to the government's own business, even
when they bear on persons outside the government who receive grants from it or enter into
contracts with it, are especially important in this connection. See Independent Meat Packers
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means, within the specialized agencies and through external checks upon
them, policy making often involves a planned combination of political,
investigational and auditory processes such as occurs nowhere else in
government. This interplay is analytically separate from, even though it
may be operationally linked to, a second kind of task which agencies
commonly perform. That task is the determination of the rights of particular persons under established policies, such as individual rights to social
security benefits defined by precise statutory provisions. Policy making
has distinct aspects and must be considered separately. In the proceedings
to be discussed here it is harnessed to agency formulation of regulations.
DEVELOPMENT OF AGENCY RULE MAKING AS A MEANS
OF POLICY DETERMINATION

The story of the development of specialized administrative agencies
and their varying powers has been told often and need not be repeated
here. 10 In relation to their form, agency functions were recognized early
as falling into the two main categories of adjudication and rule making.
Especially in the United States, the most controversial activities of the
agencies were the adjudicatory ones which, because of their procedural
departures from judicial models, drew most of the attention of commentators and became the subject of the bulk of the proposals which were
made by lawyers for the reform of agency methods. 11 Accordingly, when
comprehensive prescriptions of agency procedures applicable to all or
most of the agencies in government were enacted, they dealt in greater
detail with adjudication than with rule making. The latter, in consequence, was left generally freer of procedural requirements.
As to adjudication, the now-standard statutory pattern in the federal
system, set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,12 provides
for due notice to persons so entitled; for opportunity on the part of all
interested persons to participate in the proceedings; for consensual adjustment when feasible; for decision after merely informal proceedings,
Ass'n v. Butz, 526F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976); Mele v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975).
10 The leading American summarization is contained in the FINAL REPORT OF ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMrIEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE REPORT].
I1 A focal point of attack was the "combination of prosecutor and judge" in agencies
which both initiated and rendered decisions in adjudicatory proceedings. The extent of
substantive rule-making powers was also a matter of concern and, in England, was the focal
point of attack in Lord Hewart's influential book, THE NEW DESPOTISM (1929). The leading
early product of the lawyers' reform movement in the United States, the Walter-Logan Bill
vetoed by President Roosevelt in 1940, 86 CONG. REC. 13,942 (1940), did contain procedural
provisions for rule making as well as adjudication. See H.R. Doc. No. 986, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 12 (1941).
12 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). This Act was repealed in 1966 and its provisions are now
principally contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 4301(2)(E), 5335(a)(B),
5362 and 7521 (1970 & Supps. III 1973, V 1975).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
unless not authorized by specific statute; for opportunity for an adequate
hearing when final decisions based on nonconsensual informal proceedings are not authorized; for decisions, in many instances based wholly on
a formal record, after opportunity for a hearing; for a strict division of
labor among agency personnel in record-type proceedings, with interrelation of the results of this division taking place openly at the hearing and
decisional stages; for communication of decisions to those interested; and
for the availability of a specified scope of judicial review of final agency
decisions. As to rule making the pattern recognizes different types of
rules. As to some types, namely "interpretative rules, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice," it
omits procedural requirements altogether, except publication of the resulting pronouncements in the Federal Register.13 As to the formulation
of substantive regulations having legal force, the Act requires general
notice in the Federal Register of proposed regulations, opportunity for
both responses and suggestions from interested persons in writing or
through oral presentations, publication of the resulting regulations 14
accompanied by brief statements of their basis and purpose, and opportunity for limited judicial review. Other statutes may, of course, impose
additional requirements. If a statute requires that regulations be on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing, then additional provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act are brought into play. 5
13 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(3)(A), 552(a)(1)(D) (1970).
14This provision, by its terms, applies "unless persons subject" to a proposed rule "are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance
with law." Id. § 553(b).
An escape clause permits prepublication agency processes to be omitted in exceptional
instances. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B). In addition, the Act exempts rule making relating to a
military or foreign affairs function of the United States, or relating to agency management
or personnel, or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts from these same
processes, but not from those relating to judicial review. Id. § 553(a). Elimination of the
second part of this exemption and curtailment of the first part have been recommended by
the Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of
Certain Exemptions from the APA Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1977);
Recommendation 73-5, Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from APA Rulemaking Requirements, I C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
A.C.U.S. Recommendation].
Numerous agencies have published regulations, usually couched as policy statements,
complying voluntarily with the first recommendation by foregoing the exemption as to
public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts. 3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 229 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE REPORTS]. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2.7 (1976) (Department of
Labor); 36 Fed. Reg. 2532 (1971) (Department of HEW); id. at 8336 (1971) (Department of
the Interior). These matters are thoroughly discussed in Bonfield, Military and Foreign
Affairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 221 (1972); Bonfield,
Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants,
Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
15 The provisions for agency procedure in adjudications are contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 554559 (1970); those for procedure in rule making are in id. § 553 and those for regulations

72:83 (1977)

Development and Diversification

It has become well established that agencies which possess both
adjudicatory and rule-making powers covering the same subject matter
generally may choose whether to proceed by means of adjudication or of
rule making in resolving particular policy problems confronting them. 16 A
growing tendency among most agencies in recent years has been to
choose rule making. In addition, there has been widespread statutory
assignment to agencies of duties to regulate conduct, especially business
conduct, in the first instance by means of general regulations, especially
when the conduct affects public health, safety or welfare, consumer or
employee interests, or the environment. 17
Both developments, by increasing the use of rule making, have
raised questions concerning the applicable agency rule-making procedure
and the appropriate means and scope of judicial review of agency action
much more frequently than before. The answers to these questions may
turn on statutory provisions, judicial decisions, or, in respect to agency
processes, agency determinations to which the courts pay deference.
Varieties of Regulations and of Rule-Making Procedures
Obviously, the potential for agency resort to rule making results
from the range of rule-making authority which agencies possess. This
authority has come to depend increasingly on explicit statutory provisions, yet it still depends in part on authorization which inheres in the
requirements of good administration. These inherent requirements which
regulations can help to fulfill include the effective announcement of an
required to be on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, id. §§ 556-557. Judicial
review as to both adjudication and rule making is covered by id. §§ 701-706. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(1) (1970), provides for publication of rules. The escape clause with respect to the use
of agency procedures, id. § 553(b)(3)(B), applies "when the agency for good cause finds
[and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued]
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest." Section 553(d), again with an escape clause "for good cause found and
published," requires that the final publication of a substantive rule, unless it "grants or
recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction," take place not less than 30 days before
the effective date of the regulation. "Interpretative rules and statements of policy," which
also are to be published pursuant to section 552(a)(1), are not subject to the deferred
effectiveness requirement. Finally, section 553(e) provides that "[e]ach agency shall give an
interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal" of any of the
various kinds of regulations.
16NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Wyman-Gordon a majority
of the Court in a plurality opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas and dissenting opinions by Justices
Douglas and Harlan stressed the impropriety of an agency's attempt to lay down a new,
enforceable policy for the future as an incident to adjudication without adhering to the
Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for rule making. If a policy is so pronounced,
it remains ineffective as a regulation.
17 The first of the two developments has taken place despite frequent questions whether
authority to use the rule-making power to issue binding regulations existed in particular
instances. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
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agency's prescriptions for doing business with it, such as are set forth in
procedural rules; the issuance of internal directives to staff members; and
the announcement for the information and guidance of persons concerned
of policies and legal interpretations that are expected to determine future
agency action. Unlike these kinds of pronouncements which may be
authorized impliedly from the agency's very existence and need to
administer, rules which legally dispose of outside interests, such as
regulations which proscribe conduct or define enforceable rights, should
rest on more specific statutory or constitutional authority to issue them,

since otherwise the agency would be the architect of its own powers.

8

The various kinds of regulations which have been mentioned are
recognized as distinguishable by the federal Administrative Procedure
Act in three provisions. The first of these defines "rule" to include an
"agency statement of general . . .19 applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy ....
"20 The
second provision, already summarized, 21 exempts "interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure,
or practice" 22 from the procedural requirements of the Act for formulating regulations. The third provision, contained in the Act as amended
by the Freedom of Information Act, requires "rules of procedure... ,
substantive rules of general applicability .

.

.

,

and statements of gener-

al policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated23and adopted by the agency" to be published in the FederalRegister.
18 But see National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), in which the opinion could be understood to derive a
power of the FTC to formulate binding rules, helpful in later adjudications, simply from the
power to adjudicate with respect to the same subject matter. Nevertheless, the court also
relied on the "particularly good reason" for upholding the rule-making power, that the
statute expressly conferred authority on the Commission to "make rules and regulations for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions" of the statute, including the adjudicatory
provision in question. Id. at 675-76. The opinion also emphasized that exceptions to agency
rules should remain possible in individual instances. Id. at 692.
19 At this point the definition contains the words "or particular," the meaning of which is
obscure. The discussion in this article is confined to agency statements of general applicability to persons who come within their terms. Elimination of the words "or particular"
from the definition has been advocated by the American Bar Association and the Administrative Conference of the United States. See 3 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE REPORTS
(1975), supra note 14, at 59-61.
20 The definition adds, "or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." It goes on to include specifically "the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting,
or practices bearing on any of the foregoing." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). Elimination of this
latter enumeration has been recommended by the ABA and the Administrative Conference.
See 3 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE REPORTS (1975), supra note 14, at 59-61.
21 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
22 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1970).
23 Id. §§ 552(a)(1)(C), (D).
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The publication requirement is followed by a provision that an
agency "shall make available for public inspection and copying-...
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public." 24 The seeming inconsistency between the publication requirement and a negative inference as to such a requirement for
unpublished material covered by the disclosure requirement should not
affect the added provision of the former that "[e]xcept to the extent that a
person has adequate and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may
not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so
published"; 25 for this provision seems clearly intended to be effective as
to all material included in the*provision for publication in the Federal
Register.
The contemporary classification of agency rules conforms to conceptions, statutory authorizations and agency practice going back to the
earliest years of the republic. Alexander Hamilton articulated it in 1790 in
his Plan for Disposing of the Public Lands. 26 Congressional authorizations of legally effective substantive regulations on specific subjects
began at the same time and were scattered through the subsequent years. 27
At the very beginning of the government, in 1789, Congress authorized
"[tlhe head of each Department. . . to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his Department, the conduct of its
officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business, and
the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to it." 28 Modern regulatory statutes commonly include provisions which give the agency head power to promulgate such regulations
"as may be necessary in the administration of this Act," or "make rules
and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this
Act," or some similar form of bestowal of power which extends at least
24 Id. §§ 552(a)(2)(B), (C).

25 Id. § 552(a)(1).
26 Quoted in C. MCFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LANDS 232
(1969). See also J. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE Au-

THORITIES 29-30 (1927); Hart, The Exercise of Rule-Making Power, in PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 319-20 (1937); Lee,

Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1 (1940). But cf. Morgenthau,

Implied Regulatory Powers in Administrative Law, 28 IOWA L. REV. 575, 582-92 (1943)
(claiming there is no functional difference corresponding to the distinction between legislative and interpretative regulations).
27 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 97-98; J. COMER, supra
note 26, at 50-112; C. MCFARLAND, supra note 26, at 234-37.
28 Rev. Stat. § 161, (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)). This statute does not
extend to the so-called "independent" agencies or establishments. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-105
(1970).
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to internal directives, procedural or interpretative regulations and state29
ments of policy.
The most important categories of regulations from the standpoint of
policy making are legally binding substantive regulations, interpretative
rules, general statements of contemplated policy and internal directives
to staff members for dealing with outsiders. To the extent that the power
to choose among these is present, an agency's selection of one or another,
as well as its initial decision to use rule making rather than adjudication
for determining an issue of policy, establishes to an important extent the
processes which should prevail in the policy determination. Formerly,
freedom to forego all formulated rule-making processes prevailed, but
nothing prevented an agency from resorting to consultation with inter30
ested persons, or to hearings, in advance of the issuance of regulations.
Now the Administrative Procedure Act and the statutes establishing
various agencies contain procedural prescriptions for defined categories
of rule making. Courts also may impose requirements by their interpretation of the particular statute involved or their judgment of the prerequisites for the courts' own performance of the duty to review agency
statements. 31 Political, expert and auditory processes receive their places
in the resulting framework of procedure and review.
Unhappily from the standpoint of easy understanding, the criteria for
the decision to choose rule making over adjudication and the differing
consequences of agency choices among the various kinds of regulations
are often not easy to determine. An agency may issue interpretative
regulations or "guidelines" as to intended policies and yet find them
subject to immediate judicial review because of the nearly final effect
which a court attributes to them. 32 Agency rule-making processes which a
court may think to be required impliedly by statute or may regard as
necessary because they are prerequisites to judicial review are often not
knowable until judicially specified. Consequently, an agency, assuming
its possesssion of a full range of rule-making powers, may actually have
in a given situation the alternatives of issuing binding substantive regulations in accordance with the rudimentary procedural requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act, to which further requirements may be
added by other statutes or by courts, or of making tentative pronouncements. However, because of the weight the latter are given by the courts
and the agency's need for data to undergird them, even those pronouncements should arguably be preceded by processes similar to those required
33
for legally binding regulations.
29 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 98.

30 Id. at 103.
31 See text accompanying notes 115-135 infra.
32 See Fuchs, Prerequisitesto JudicialReview ofAdministrativeAgency Action (pt. 1), 51
IND. L.J. 817 (1976), and works cited at 985; Comment, Timing ofJudicialReview Underthe
Administrative ProcedureAct, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1491 (1968).
33 See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the Making of
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Tendencies Toward Agency Choice of Rule Making
Over Adjudication
Questions concerning an agency's use of regulations to bind future
adjudications arise when it has specific authority to determine particular
matters by adjudication and only a general authority to make rules. Such
general rule-making authority may in some instances extend only to
procedural rules, internal directives and nonbinding interpretative regulations or statements of policy. When binding substantive regulations are
included, arguably they may not be authorized as to matters which the
governing statute has committed to adjudication. 34 One reason for such a
result could be that the agency is obligated in each case to reach a single
decision that takes account of all relevant factors without foreclosure of
any issue by predetermined rules. 35 A second reason, more pertinent
here, arises when the statute specifies a procedure for adjudication which
may not be accorded if rule making is substituted and may arguably have
been withheld invalidly as to issues which the resulting regulations
cover.

36

In most instances of rule making to formulate binding substantive
regulations, only the Administrative Procedure Act's so-called noticeInterpretativeRules and GeneralStatements of Policy UndertheA.P.A.,23 AD. L. REV. 101
(1971); Koch, Public Proceduresfor the Promulgation of InterpretativeRules and General
Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1976). The UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 1(7) (1961), attaches its procedural
requirements to "each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets,
or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency."
Some agencies have indicated in procedural rules or actual practice an intention to
follow notice-and-response processes in issuing regulations for which the Administrative
Procedure Act does not require them. See, e.g., the Internal Revenue Service rule, 26
C.F.R. § 601.601(a)(2) (1976), setting forth rule-making procedures pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
553 (1970) which are to be followed not only pursuant to the statute but, as well, "in such
other instances as may be desirable." Many of the regulations so formulated are interpretative. The formulation of rules of practice is also carried on in a similar manner from time to
time by federal agencies. As to the utility of this process to the practicing bar, see the
resolution of the Board of Governors and House of Delegates of the American Bar Association reported in 52 A.B.A.J. 401 (1966).
34 See Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
781, 796-807 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fuchs, 1965].
35 This principle applies to all "freezing" of policy which should by statute remain open
to case-by-case determination, but does not exclude general statements, whether in the
course of adjudicatory opinions or made as separate rule-making pronouncements, which
are tentative and are merely to be taken into account in each subsequent adjudication. See
Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
270 F.2d 167, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 943 (1960) (attempted general
policy applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner); North American Van Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 412 F. Supp. 782, 795-99 (N.D. Ind. 1976); E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 214 (1928).
36 See text accompanying notes 42-48 infra.
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and-comment procedures, summarized above, 37 need be followed. Two

other sections of the Act, applicable also to adjudication, are applicable to
rule making which is required by another statute to be "on the record

after opportunity for an agency hearing."

38

However, even in these

instances of rule making, the hearing which is accorded can be limited

wholly or partially to written submissions "when a party will not be
prejudiced thereby," ' 39 and also certain other requirements for adjudication need not be followed. 40
Aside from these procedural differences, certain comparative advantages and disadvantages of rule making and adjudication have been
repeatedly considered. 4 1 The advantages of rule making include the
facility of deciding a recurring issue by a single determination, and the

possibility of assembling all relevant information from a variety of
sources at that time. Notice of the determination to persons concerned,
who may then respond or adjust to it, usually follows. The advantages of

adjudication lie chiefly in the thoroughness with which the detailed formulation of policy in particular situations can be judged when policy is
made. Obviously, rule making that covers a class of cases becomes

increasingly feasible after adjudication in a number of representative
instances has taken place.
The legitimacy of numerous instances of agency use of a general
rule-making authority to foreclose particular issues in later adjudications
37 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
38 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970) provides that sections 556 and 557 shall apply to these "on the
record" rule-making situations, instead of the preceding provisions of section 553(c).
39 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
40 For example, when an agency "makes a decision without having presided at the
reception of the evidence," the presiding officer or an equally qualified substitute "shall
first recommend a decision," but in rule making and initial licensing proceedings
(1) instead thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or one of its responsible
employees may recommend a decision; or (2) this procedure may be omitted in a case
in which the agency finds on the record that due and timely execution of its functions
imperatively and unavoidably so requires.
Id. § 557(b). In addition, numerous procedural provisions in section 554 for adjudication on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, including safeguards against off-therecord consultations and partiality affecting decisions, do not apply to rule making.
Except for publication of regulations, the Act, as has been noted, supra note 14,
exempts rule making which involves "a military or foreign affairs function of the United
States" or "a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public property,
loans, grants, benefits, or contracts" from procedural requirements. Id. § 553(a).
41 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 6.01 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
K. DAVIS, 1976]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15 (Supp. 1970); Fuchs,
1965, supra note 34, at 788-91; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965). H. FRIENDLY, THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 143-47 (1962), has been especially influential. For
procedural purposes, other characteristics of agency proceedings can be regarded as more
significant than their identification as rule making or adjudication. See Boyer, supra note 2;
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
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for which a statutory procedure is prescribed has been sustained in
judicial decisions which have been comprehensively reviewed. 42 Recent
major court decisions are to the same effect. 4 3 An agency's freedom or
obligation to resort to its general rule-making authority in preference to
adjudication when it has adjudicatory power over the subject involved is
44
obviously negated to the extent the adjudicatory power is exclusive.
Doubtless there are statutory provisions for adjudication which are in42 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 307-14 (1970 Supp.); Fuchs, 1965, supra
note 34; Fuchs, The New Administrative State: JudicialSanctionfor Agency Self-Determination in the Regulation of Industry, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 216, 224-37 (1969); Robinson, supra
note 41; Shapiro, supra note 41; Note, The Use of Agency Rulemaking to Deny Adjudications Apparently Required by Statute, 54 IOWA L. REV. 1086 (1969).
43 See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 539
F.2d 767, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (national maximum producers' price for natural gas shipped in
interstate commerce set by means of rule making held valid); Washington Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1976); Bell Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975); Hughes Air
Corp. v. CAB, 492 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). The
question here relates to the use of rule making in place of adjudication to decide particular
issues, not to the procedures which may be required in the particular instances of rule
making that result. Typically these procedures are less safeguarded (auditory) than those in
the adjudication they supplant. The resulting rules, moreover, bind all interested persons,
subject to their rights to petition later for amendments of new regulations or, possibly,
"waivers" in individual instances if the agency allows them to be sought. See Community
Serv. Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1969); Fuchs, 1965, supra note 34, at 782,
804-06.
A general practice of making "generic" environmental impact determinations applicable to all similar licensing cases by rule and those relating to single applications by adjudication has been recommended by the Administrative Conference of the United States. 3

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE REPORTS (1975), supra note 14, at 31. Questions concerning

the wisdom of so sweeping a recommendation are raised in an accompanying statement of
conference member Kenneth Culp Davis. Id. at 33.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rules of Practice provide for the determination
of any issues common to more than one license application in proceedings which are, in
effect, partially consolidated for this purpose. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.401-407, pt. 50, App. N (1976).
The Commission may also resort to rule-making proceedings to determine issues which are,
or will be, common to classes of license applications. It cannot, in the meanwhile, take
definitive action on pending license applications before the relevant general determinations
have been made by regulation. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976). See generally Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1974); Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Murphy, The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act and the Licensing Process:Environmentalist Magna Carta or Agency Coup de Grace?,72 COLUM. L. REV. 963, 988-90, 997-1005
(1972).
44 Cf. Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U.S. 599 (1930), holding that the involved
agency could not by general regulation (prior to the provision of rule-making procedures by
the Administrative Procedure Act) terminate outstanding licenses, revocable after hearing,
even though the regulation gave opportunity for renewal applications to be filed and acted
upon before the regulation became effective.
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tended to be exclusive in this manner, at least as to the most essential
issues in the adjudicatory proceedings; but the existence and scope of
instances of this exclusiveness have become difficult to identify. In a
previous article the present writer sought to suggest possible bases for
their identification.4 5 Since then the potential for rule making in place of
statutory adjudication has gone beyond the possibilities which the Supreme Court contemplated at that time. In FPCv. Texaco, Inc., a leading
decision which upheld the use of rule making, the Supreme Court noted
that the regulations there involved "do not pass on the merits of any rate
structure nor on the merits of a certificate of public convenience and
necessity; they merely prescribe qualifications for applicants." 4 6 The
inference was that proceedings to frame regulations which included the
kinds of determinations mentioned might well be beyond the power of the
Commission to employ in place of the statutory procedures specifically
provided. Insofar as the unique aspects of a particular producer's "rate
structure" or certificate are concerned, the inference still holds; but
subsequent decisions have not determined which aspects of rates or
elements of public convenience and necessity may be determined by
regulations. 47 This generalized process of rate making could leave little to
be determined in individual cases, except to the extent that "waivers" of
48
the regulations or exceptions to them might be considered.
The presence of the agencies' freedom and tendency to use rule
making, which has just been outlined, does not mean, of course, that rule
making has swept the field, leaving little adjudication to be done. On the
contrary, only in exceptional (but seemingly increasing) instances have
important, recurring issues in a continuing flow of adjudications been
predetermined by rules; and at least the National Labor Relations Board
holds fast to its practice of enunciating substantive policies only by means
of pronouncements in adjudicatory opinions. 49 Nevertheless, the change
has been significant among the regulatory agencies as a group.
45 Fuchs, 1965, supra note 34, at 800-04. See also FitzGerald, Adoption of FederalPower
Commission Price-ChangingRules Without Evidentiary Hearing: Statutory Collision, 18
Sw. L.J. 236 (1964) (in defense of the maintenance of statutory adjudicative procedures or
their equivalent).
46 377 U.S. 33, 42 (1964).
47 For analyses of the situation prior to Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir.
1975), see Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-The New Approach at the FPC: Ad Hoc
Rulemaking in the Ratemaking Process, 1973 DUKE L.J. 41; Nathanson, supra note 1, at
734-35 n.77.
48 The Supreme Court has stressed the significance of the availability of these means of
overcoming the effects of regulations in later adjudications which they affect. FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192, 205 (1956). See Murphy, supra note 43, at 1003-04, with regard to the use of these
means of overcoming an agency rule.
49 Although the Board's rules of practice provide for petitions for the issuance, amendment or repeal of rules to be filed with it and for their consideration, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.124125 (1976), it has only four substantive regulations in effect, all of which deal with narrow
topics. Id. §§ 103.1-.3,.100.
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Compulsion to Precede Adjudication by Regulations
Under some circumstances in which highly personal interests have
been at stake, lower federal courts have occasionally held, 50 and in other
instances strongly indicated, 51 that, as a means of affording notice of the
grounds of possible adverse agency action, regulations stating these
grounds must precede and underlie unfavorable adjudications, even without an explicit statutory requirement to this effect. The Supreme Court in
1974 lent support52 of undefined scope to this principle by its decision in
Morton v. Ruiz.
The Ruiz case involved the claim of an out-of-work Papago Indian
couple to monetary assistance, pursuant to a federal statute authorizing
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Interior, to extend such assistance. They had lived in Arizona for many
years near their place of employment not far from the Papago Reservation
and maintained tribal contacts with the group that lived on the reservation. The principal question at issue was whether their place of residence
rendered them geographically ineligible for the payments. The statute
required the Bureau to "direct, supervise, and expend such money as
Congress may from time to time appropriate, for the benefit, care, and
assistance of the Indians throughout the United States" for purposes
which included "relief of distress and conservation of health." 5 3 Successive appropriation acts had provided money over the years for "grants
and other assistance to needy Indians." 5 4 The Ruiz claim was rejected
50 Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1973) (existing policies governing rejection of

driver's license applicants must be formulated and announced); Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (due process requires stated standards to
govern ohoice of tenants for public housing project); Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570,

577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Administrative Procedure Act intends, and considerations of basic
fairness require, that grounds of possible debarment of government contractor from further

business with government be specified in advance in regulations); Hornsby v. Allen, 326
F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir.), rehearingdeniedpercuriam, 330 F.2d 55 (1964) (grounds for refusal
of liquor store license must be specified in advance by regulations); Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960) (unpublished internal statement of policy cannot supply

basis for disqualifying counsel of taxpayer's choice in appearance before revenue agents);
Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976) (written, objective and ascertainable standards required for the denial of public assistance to poor persons); Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 895 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (due
process requires that disciplinary proceedings in penal institutions be preceded by regula-

tions defining punishable conduct). See the additional decisions cited in K. DAVIS, 1976,
supra note 41, at 224-29.
51 See K. DAvis, 1976, supra note 41, at 224-29. Decisions which hold regulations to be
void for vagueness imply that an absence of regulations would be at least equally invalid.
See, e.g., Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
52 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
53 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
54 415 U.S. at 206-07.
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administratively, after which suit was instituted as a "purported class
55
action. "
Since 1952 the Bureau had included in its Indian Affairs Manual a
provision to the effect that "[e]ligibility for general assistance is limited
to Indians living on reservations and in jurisdictions under the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma." 5 6 This statement of policy was
not published elsewhere, but the Manual, although primarily an internal
document for the instruction of Bureau personnel, was available to the
public in Bureau offices. 57 In its letter rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the
Bureau, without giving other reasons, cited the limiting provision as the
58
basis for its decision.
Interpretation of the statute was affected by the legislative history
relating to the successive appropriations, which contained statements
from officials of the Bureau made to congressional committees that in
practice the Bureau sometimes extended benefits to Indians living near,
but not on, reservations elsewhere than in Alaska and Oklahoma. 5 9 One
question was whether Congress had, in effect, ratified either the manual
provision or the somewhat less narrow practice which had been followed
at times. Another was whether, even if Congress had ratified the practice,
the Bureau still had implied power to limit the statute however interpreted. A third question was whether, even if it had that power, it had
exercised it consistently with the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Bureau's own regulations.
As to the first of these questions, the Court held that Congress had
impliedly ratified the less narrow policy which at times was actually
followed.6" As to the second question, the Court held that "it does not
necessarily follow that the secretary is without [an implied, continuing]
power to create reasonable classifications and eligibility requirements
[more restrictive than the statute] in order to allocate the limited funds
available to him for this purpose.'"61 It would, however, in relation to the
third question, "be incumbent upon" the Bureau and the Secretary "to
develop an eligibility standard to deal with this problem," that was
"rational and proper. "62 They had not effectively accomplished this task
63
by means of the Manual.
55 Id. at 204-05.
56 Id. at 204 n.6.
57 See Davis, Administrative Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 823,
834 n.43 (19.75) [hereinafter cited as Davis, Ruiz Article].
58 415 U.S. at 204.
59 Ia. at 212-29.
60 Id. at 229-30.
61 Id. at 230.
62 Id. at 231.
63 Id. at 236. The Manual's provision failed also as an interpretation of the governing
statute by the Bureau, to which deference was due. Id. at 236-37. "The parameter of [the
plaintiffs'] class will be determined, to the extent necessary, by the District Court on
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The permissible means of establishing an "eligibility standard"
were discussed by the Court. The standard must, "at a minimum. . . be
64
generally known so as to assure that it is being applied consistently''
and it may not consist of "unpublished ad hoc determinations.' '65 In the
case of an agency like the Bureau of Indian Affairs, possessing power to
issue legally binding regulations, 66 the standard could clearly be embodied in such regulations adopted in conformity with the Administrative

Procedure Act; but the opinion is obscure as to whether regulations of this
type would be the only valid means of establishing a standard. 67 In
relation to the Bureau function involved, of dispensing a public grant or
benefit, the use of a legally binding regulation would not at the time the

Manual provision was formulated have required the use of section 553

procedures prior to publication of the rule. 68 These procedures would
apply now, however, because the Department of the Interior has undertaken to use them "to the fullest extent possible," regardless of the
statutory exemption of regulations relating to public property, loans,
69
grants, benefits, or contracts.
The Court dealt not only with the special obligations of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, 70 but also more broadly with the "power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded proremand of the case. Whether other persons qualify for general assistance will be left to cases
that arise in the future." Id. at 238.
64 Id. at 231.
65 Id. at 232.
66 25 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1970), quoted in 415 U.S. at 231 n.26.
67 As Professor Davis has pointed out, Davis, Ruiz Article, supra note 57, at 829-30,
the conclusion that legally binding regulations are the exclusive means of developing an
eligibility standard is arguably supported by the statement of the Court that "[tihe conscious
choice of the Secretary not to treat this extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians, as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective so far as
extinguishing rights of those otherwise within the class of beneficiaries contemplated by
Congress is concerned." 415 U.S. at 236. Clearly, the Court felt that a legislative regulation
was necessary to the stated effect of "extinguishing [the] rights" in question, and it clearly
preferred the Bureau's use of such regulations for dealing with the subject. However, the
alternative, which is discussed in the text, of adopting and duly publishing an agency
"statement of policy," which might then be employed as an element in agency reasoning to
"adversely affect" future claimants without becoming a basis for itself "extinguishing"
their rights, was not necessarily excluded. The Court takes note of this alternative and
concludes that it too failed in this case because the agency's statement of policy in the
Indian Affairs Manual was not published in the Federal Register or otherwise made known
to these claimants before being used in the decision to affect them adversely.
68 See note 14 supra.
69 36 Fed. Reg. 8336-37 (1971). See also note 14 supra. Such self-imposed procedural
policies, duly published, are binding on the issuing agency, subject to such flexibility as their
terms may allow. As to the policy here involved, adopted by other agencies, see Florida v.
Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1975); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp.
503, 517-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
70 The Court stressed "[t]he distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." 415 U.S. at 236.
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gram" which, the Court said, "necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress."71 As to some agencies conceivably covered by this pronouncement, a limitation of policy formulation to legally binding rules,
excluding nonbinding statements of general policy published in the Federal Register, would impose substantial procedural requirements. The
Court does not seem to have intended to impose such a limitation upon
the Bureau itself or upon other agencies; for although it gauged the effect
of the Indian Affairs Manual provision as an attempted binding regulation, it was also aware that the provision could have been a nonbinding
statement of intended general policy if it had been published and used as

such.
As the Court noted,7 2 the Administrative Procedure Act as amended
by the Freedom of Information Act requires "statements of general policy
or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the
agency" as well as "substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law," to be published in the FederalRegister.7 3 The Act
further requires that "[e]xcept to the extent that a person has actual and
timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be
required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be
published in the Federal Register and not so published." 74 The Ruiz's
71 Id. at 231.
72 Id. at 232-33. See also North American Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 412 F. Supp.
782, 795 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
73 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970).
74 Id. § 552(a)(1). As Professor Davis has pointed out, Davis, Ruiz Article, supra note 57,
at 838-39, a separate provision of the Freedom of Information Act amendments to the
Administrative Procedure Act, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 4, 88 Stat. 1564
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975)), requires
that "those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register" and "administrative staff manuals and
instructions to staff that affect a member of the public" must be made available for public
inspection and copying "unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for
sale."
By implication, therefore, it could be concluded that staff manuals such as the Indian
Affairs Manual, even when they affect members of the public, and even statements of
policy which have been adopted by an agency, need not be published in the Federal
Register, but could, instead, be made available by the stated alternative means. More
probably, however, the requirement of publication in the Federal Register still prevails as to
statements of general policy formulated and adopted by an agency, including any portions of
administrative staff manuals which have been so formulated and adopted, supplemented by
a requirement of disclosure of specified material which, for whatever reason, has not been
so published.
In addition, the sanction for nonpublication in the FederalRegister-the nonenforceability of regulations and statements that affect persons adversely, unless these persons have
"actual and timely notice thereof"-still seems to apply to all of the material which
is
covered by the basic publication requirement contained in section 552(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Staff manuals may still contain numerous substantive agency instruc-
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were apparently not actually informed of the manual provision, which
would have "adversely affected" them even as a mere statement of
intended general policy, until they were notified of the Bureau's initial
decision. Therefore, the statement could not be applied to their disadvantage; but seemingly it could have been made part of the rationale of an
adverse decision if it had been published previously in the Federal
Register or otherwise effectively communicated to them. If so, the
Bureau and the Secretary in establishing eligibility standards for the
future can still choose between binding rules, adopted and published as
required by law, and more flexible statements of general policy freely
formulated and adopted but also published in the Federal Register or
otherwise effectively communicated to prospective claimants.
Even as so interpreted, the Ruiz decision breaks new ground on two
important points: (1) its assertion that an agency having powers to issue
binding rules may develop eligibilty standards by means of regulations
promulgated in light of the amount of appropriated funds, even to the
extent of restricting eligibility which the governing statute seems clearly
to bestow, and (2) its holding that such limitations on eligibility may not
be newly imposed case by case, even on the basis of reasoned opinions,
because the limitations must be made known in advance to persons
adversely affected by them. The power to develop eligibility standards
seemingly contrary to statute is extremely broad and difficult to control.
As formulated by the Court, it could even be part of a larger authority of
any agency having full rule-making authority to fill gaps in its governing
statute when necessary "to administer a congressionally created and
funded program." 7 5 Such a program might conceivably be quite different
from the one involved in the Ruiz case, consisting of any variety of
regulatory power which required money for its administration and could
be applied only selectively because of budgetary constriction. 76 The
Court was dealing, however, with a program which consisted simply of
the distribution of appropriated funds without statutory goals other than to
tions which need not be published, such as positions to be taken in negotiations, until the
agency has more fully formulated its policies.
75 415 U.S. at 231.
76 The selective enforcement of laws when the means of complete effectuation are
lacking is a governmental necessity. Occasionally, less compelling reasons may justify
selective enforcement. Cf. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483 (D.C.

Cir. 1968) (upholding CAB's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over foreign tour operators).
As Professor Davis has well brought out, the exercise of the resulting administrative
discretion can be greatly improved by the use of explicit policy guides, as well as by other
means. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969). Rigid guides can scarcely be
used where their effect would be to grant absolution to conduct which the legislature has

proscribed. Conceivably, in other situations, such as the distribution of governmental
benefits, they can be justified or even be essential to even-handed administration, as the
Court thought was true with respect to Indian benefits. The point which is emphasized here
is that the principle announced by the Court in the Ruiz case should not be understood to
extend beyond closely analogous situations.
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supply economic and social benefit, care and assistance to Indians at
whatever location or level of need.77 Its potential monetary reach was
great and appropriations to carry it out might be severely limited. It seems
sensible to conclude, therefore, that the Court's assertion of implied
agency power to develop "eligibility standards" and "fill gaps" applies
only to a program which is broadly defined by statute and is "funded" in
the sense of consisting wholly of the distribution of money in total
amounts which the Congress has left itself free to vary from year to
78
year.
The Court's exclusion of case-by-case development of eligibility
standards, without advance notice of the standards, arose at least in part
because they affected "substantial individual rights and obligations. . . . "79 The principle underlying the decision on this point probably does not extend beyond similar situations involving the interests of
individual human beings. It would be a mistake to conclude on the basis
of the Ruiz holding that the use of agency adjudication to develop policy
generally is newly restricted by the decision. The Court's reaffirmation in
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. ,80 decided two months later, of the Board's
authority to develop new policies by adjudication, emphasizes the point.
In Bell Aerospace, the Ruiz decision was neither cited nor distinguished
and seemingly was not regarded as relevant to the regulation of collective
81
labor relations.
Statutory Proliferationof Rule-Making Powers and Processes
Increased authorization by Congress of binding regulations as the
primary means of effectuating agency regulation of conduct and accomplishing the bestowal of government services has taken place for one or
more of several reasons. Often, the regulated conduct arises frequently
and the services are widespread, requiring general rules; yet the need for
specialized inquiry into underlying problems and possible solutions as
policy continues to develop, renders statutory rules too rigid. Political
77 The statute as written contains sufficient guides for the use of appropriated money to
escape unconstitutionality on its face. See text accompanying note 53 supra. Whether the
discretion which the Court seemingly finds to reside in the administration of variable
appropriations under the statute is constitutional will depend on the restrictions on eligibility
for benefits which the Court would sustain. The restrictions should, it would seem, be tied

to the statutory guides in a rational manner.
78 Under the usual statute calling for administration, there is an implied legislative
commitment to continue to fund the stipulated program, the needs of which constitute a
measure of the periodic appropriations that will be made. Under the statute involved in the
Ruiz case, there was no such program but only a directive to expend money which the
Congress might make available from time to time.
79 415 U.S. at 232.
80 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
81 The Court did state: "There may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act." Id. at 294.
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factors often remain prominent in relation to such matters, even after the
governing statutes have partially dealt with them; but their influence
needs to be systematized and limited by requiring interested persons to
present their contentions in the course of agency inquiries or during
statutorily prescribed hearings. Judicial review of the resulting regulations is often explicitly authorized and given specific scope by statute to
provide added safeguards against abuse or serious error.
These features of much recent federal legislation, largely relating to
public health, consumer welfare, public or employee safety, and the
preservation of a healthful, ecologically sound environment, have been
ably analyzed. 82 At the minimum, subject to possible exceptions as to
even that much,8 3 this legislation requires adherence to the basic rulemaking procedure set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, which is
summarized above, 84 consisting initially of notice of proposed rule making by an agency, published in the FederalRegister, followed by opportunity for written responses of interested persons which are to be considered
by the agency so far as relevant. When it takes final action, "the agency
shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose. '"85 At what was once the maximum, the applicable
legislation might require adherence to the additional procedures specified
in the Administrative Procedure Act for regulations 8required
to be "on
6
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."
The Act provides a differing scope of judicial review appropriate to
these different methods of formulating regulations. The first kind of
regulation shall, in essence, be held invalid if the agency action, findings
and conclusions are found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion; if unconstitutional or violative of law; if issued without observance of procedure required by law; or if "unwarranted by the facts to
the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court." ,87 Regulations required to be based on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing. shall be held invalid for the first three of the
foregoing reasons and, in addition, if "unsupported by substantial evidence . . . on the record." 88
82 See, e.g., Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The
Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276

(1972) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
83 Prepromulgation procedures may be omitted "when the agency for good cause finds

(and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued)
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the

public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1970).
84 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
85 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
86 Id.

87 Id. §§ 706(2)(A)-(D), (F).
88 Id. § 706(2)(E).
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A new maximum for several procedural requirements of rule making
is incorporated in the Federal Trade Commission Act amendments of
197589 and in the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.90 The principal
addenda to previous maximum Administrative Procedure Act requirements, contained in the FTC Act amendments, are: a statement of reasons
for a proposed rule to be embodied in the initial notice of the proceedings; 9 1 public disclosure of all written responses received; 92 opportunity
for oral presentations, including controlled rights of rebuttal and crossexamination; 93 and a more elaborate statement supporting a regulation
than the Administrative Procedure Act requires. 94 The oral hearing may
be "informal" 95 and, as is true also under the Administrative Procedure
Act's maximum requirements, the Commission is placed under outside
pressure to disclose information in its own possession, on which it may
rely, by two main factors: (1) the need to provide in the record on judicial
review substantial evidence in support of a regulation being challenged,
but not necessarily additional data which the agency does not think it
necessary to include, 96 and (2) its potential obligation to make disclosures
on demand, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act section of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 97
The Toxic Substances Control Act contains similar provisions, some
of which are spelled out in meticulous detail, 98 and, in addition, provides
for advice from a commission of outside experts concerning the initiation
89 Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a-57c (Supp. V 1975)).
The amendments authorize the Federal Trade Commission to issue trade regulation rules
forbidding specific unfair acts or practices. As to other aspects of this legislation, see
generally Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond APA: Criteriafor Trial-Type Proceduresand the
FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1976); Nelson, The Politicization of
FTC Rulemaking, 8 CONN. L. REV. 413 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nelson].
90 Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2629 (Supp. 4
1976)).
91 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b) (Supp. V 1975).
92 Id.
93 Id. § 57a(c).
94 Id. § 57a(d)(1).
95 Id. §§ 57a(b)(3), (c).
96 The FTC Act amendments render the substantial evidence test applicable to judicial
review of the regulations covered. Id. § 57a(e)(3)(A). Cumulative data, supportive of that in
the record on which the regulation rested, need hardly be entered. However, good faith
would require the inclusion of countervailing data which the agency took into account and
which would have a bearing on the substantiality of the evidence on which it relied.
97 Id. §§ 552(a)(3), (4). The Freedom of Information Act does not deal with the records of
agency proceedings, but use of the Act may permit disclosure to take the place of discovery
in a pending proceeding. The potentiality of such compelled disclosure during or after a rulemaking proceeding may increase the likelihood of agency disclosures on the record, insofar
as the Act's exemptions do not apply. See Fuchs, supra note 32, at 847 n. 112; Nelson, supra
note 89, at 441 n.106.
98 See Pub. L. No. 94-469, §§ 4(d), (e), 90 Stat. 2009-2012 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§
2603(d), (e) (Supp. 4 1976)).
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of requirements for testing suspect chemical substances and mixtures. 99
An unusual requirement obliges the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, who administers the Act, to file a statement of
reasons for not carrying forward within tatutory time limits a proceeding
to provide control regulations for an allegedly toxic substance of which he
has been notified in accordance with the statute. 10
The purposes of these rule-making procedural requirements are,
mainly, four-fold: (1) to provide adequate means, in a forum different
from the representative legislature, for interested persons to participate in
the proceedings, directly or through others; 10 1 (2) to secure for the agency
relevant information and views, supplementing those which it possesses
by virtue of its specialized knowledge and previous inquiries; (3) to
provide means through the use of particular elements of the auditory
process for participants to test the soundness of material introduced; and
(4) to maintain, through judicial review or otherwise, a check on the
legality, rationality and sometimes the fidelity to duty of the agency's
performance. Crucial points on the spectrum of rule-making processes
now in effect in relation to these purposes are: (1) the adequacy of the
published notice of proposed rule making to inform interested persons of
the matters to which they should address their responses; (2) the means,
provided statutorily, of consultation by the agency with others prior to
action; (3) the extent to which participants in a rule-making proceeding
should be given access to material coming from others outside the
agency; (4) the extent to which the agency is to be required to disclose
material in its hands and used by it in formulating new regulations; (5) the
nature and extent of oral hearings and use of rebuttal and cross-examination which shall be allowed in a rule-making proceeding; (6) the amount
of information to be supplied to a reviewing court concerning agency
consideration of the issues before it; and (7) the extent to which a
reviewing court may properly substitute its judgment for that of the rulemaking agency in determining the validity of a regulation.
Aside from the provisions in the FTC Act amendments and Toxic
Substances Control Act, already noted, some of the more significant
99 15 U.S.C.A. § 2603(e).
100 Id. § 2604(g).
101 The FTC Act amendments facilitate this purpose, as well as augment the fairness of
the rule-making process involved, by providing for the Commission's payment of the fees
for representation of persons having an interest in participation, upon a showing of inability
to pay these costs otherwise. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(1) (Supp. V 1975). This provision is
different from, but bears a relation to, the widely recommended policies of aiding poor
persons to participate in agency proceedings of many kinds affecting them, and of providing
by law for the representation of consumer interests in relevant agency proceedings. See 1
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE REPORTS

(1971), supra note 14, at 13-20 (as to poor persons)

(A.C.U.S. Recommendation No. 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of
Direct Consequence to Them, I C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1977)); S. 200, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1975;
121 CONG. REC. S8423-24 (daily ed. May 15, 1975) and H10749-50 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1975) (as

to consumers).
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provisions in recent federal legislation specifying rule-making procedures
going beyond those prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act deserve some attention. The Consumer Products Safety Act10 2 and Marine
Mammal Protection Act 103 require that notices of proposed rule making
include, respectively, the texts of rules proposed for adoption, and statements of facts and evidence in support of the proposals made. Several
statutes require or specifically empower the rule-making agencies to
consult other agencies or outside persons at some point in the process of
Several others establish or authorize the creation of
consideration."
advisory bodies of outsiders, to some extent representative of interest
10 5
groups, but more largely technical in character, for this purpose.
Additional specific provisions for disclosure of material from extraagency sources, acquired during agency rule-making proceedings, have
not been identified; however, provisions for the ultimate inclusion of
such material in the agency record on which judicial review will be based
render its earlier disclosure more likely.'°6 Also, the holding of "public
hearings" when opportunity for them is required, as it is under several
statutes,107 would secure disclosure of written submissions during these
hearings, except for trade secrets or other confidential material contained
in them. An agency's disclosure of relevant material in its own files
seems to remain free of comprehensive requirements, but obligations to

include data in notices of proposed rule making, to have public hearings,
to provide full statements in support of regulations when published, and
to supply substantial evidence in support of a regulation being reviewed
102 15 U.S.C. § 2056(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
103 16 U.S.C. § 1373(d) (Supp. V 1975).
104 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970); Federal Coal Mine Health
& Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 811(c)-(f) (1970); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1314(b), 1317(a)(7), 1322(e) (Supp. V 1975); Air Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857e
(1970); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1804(b) (Supp. V 1975).
105 National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1393 (1970); Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1609 (1970); Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(1), 656(b) (1970); Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 812
(1970); Air Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857e (1970).
106 The Fair Packaging & Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (1970), by reference to the
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(e)-(g) (1970), and the Occupational Safety
& Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970), provide for judicial review in which the regulations
must be supported by substantial evidence in the agency record. Such is also the effect of
provisions for 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 procedures, contained in the Postal Reorganization
Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3624(a) (1970), and, without specifying sections 556 or 557, in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1373(d) (Supp. V 1975). The requirement of "substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole" appears in the Occupational Safety &
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970).
107 Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1970); Federal Coal Mine
Health & Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 811(g) (1970); Air Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-7(b)(1)(B). Section 1857c-5 of the Air Pollution Control Act requires public hearings in
the formulation of state air pollution control plans which may be submitted for federal
approval.
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judicially, all of which are imposed by some statutes, supply partial
substitutes without rendering horrendous records mandatory. Opportunity
for "public" or "oral ' 108 hearings is required with some frequency; but
informal hearings usually are intended, as the legislation sometimes
indicates by invoking section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 109
Rights of rebuttal and cross-examination are usually not spelled out.110
Relatively full statements or findings in support of final, published
regulations are required by the Occupational Safety and Health Act'1 ' and
the Consumer Products Safety Act. 112 These, like the more conventional
"statement of. . .basis and purpose" which the Administrative Procedure Act generally requires, become part of the agency record which is
used on judicial review. Other ingredients of the now-typical agency
record for purposes of review in the United States courts of appeals are, in
addition to the agency order (or regulation) itself, "the findings or report
upon which" the order or rule "is based," and "the pleadings, evidence,
portions thereof as may be
and proceedings before the agency," or such
113
designated by various appropriate means.
No consistent pattern or rationally related set of patterns of rulemaking procedures emerges from the variety of statutory provisions just
summarized. Many procedural differences result from varying traditions
in particular areas of government operation or from shifting patterns of
legislation, 114 as well as from the interplay of group pressures and
legislators' purposes which impinge on successive enactments. Recurringly discernible, nevertheless, are indications that the increasing variety
108Oral hearings are to be offered under the Consumer Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2058(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975), the Consumer Product Warranties Act, id. § 2309, and the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (Supp. V 1975).
109 National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1970); Consumer
Products Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975); Consumer Product Warranties
Act, id. § 2309; Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 4(b)(5), 90 Stat. 2008
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2603(b)(5) (1976)); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1804(a) (Supp. V 1975).
The reference in the National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act is to the Administrative Procedure Act as a whole; but section 553 applies, as it does to agency rule making
generally, unless excluded by superseding statutory provisions.
110 The provision of the FTC Act amendments in this regard is exceptional. See note 93
supra.
11129 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1970).
11215 U.S.C. § 2058(c) (Supp. V 1975).
11328 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (1970); FED. R. App. P. 16, 17. The Consumer Products Safety Act
invokes the record-filing provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2112, but contains its own, adapted
definition of the record on review of a consumer product safety rule. 15 US.C. § 2060(a)
(Supp. V 1975). General-jurisdiction review in the district courts, as envisaged in light of
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and Camp v. Pitts,
411 U.S. 138 (1973), rests in the first instance on a similar foundation. See Nathanson, supra
note 1, at 762-68; Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-51 (1975).
114 See Hamilton, supra note 82, at 1314-15.
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of procedural requirements represents efforts to make adjustments among
the ensuing processes: political struggle in formulating regulations; investigation by specialists to arrive at measures based on relevant factors
within their expertise; and the auditory process in agencies and courts

whereby inquiry is sometimes enlarged and, in any event, whereby
contending forces may be channeled and data and views entered and
tested.

ParallelJudicialDevelopments
Judicial decisions as to requisite agency rule-making procedures,
based on due process considerations or implied statutory requirements,
preceded and have to some extent paralleled the legislative developments
just reviewed. Early in the history of railroad rate regulation, a requirement arose that notice and hearing be given to a railroad company prior to
commission action lowering its rates, seemingly without regard to
whether only a single carrier or a larger number were involved. 115 In
some instances of penally enforceable regulations, agency findings
accompanying the regulations as to facts which the statute makes prerequisite to a regulation, have been held constitutionally required. 116 More
recently, following earlier suggestions, 1 7 a few cases, especially in the
United States Court of Appeals and District Court for the District of
1 18
Columbia, have held, contrary to the previous general understanding,
that agency rule making which may have adverse economic effects on
large numbers of people1 19 or result in impairment of first amendment
rights' 20 must, as a matter of due process, accord some basic auditory
procedures to persons concerned. An effort to avoid due process issues
115 Chicago, Milw. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457 (1890). See also id. at
460 (Miller, J., concurring).
116 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935). See also United States v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 293 U.S. 454, 462-65 (1935). But see Pacific States Box & Basket Co.
v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1935) (findings not required when prerequisite facts not
specified by statute).
117 See Fuchs, ConstitutionalImplications of the Opp Cotton Mills Case With Respect to
Procedure and Judicial Review in AdministrativeRule-Making, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 7-13
(1941).
118 The development and prevalence of this understanding that due process does not
require opportunity for hearings to be accorded in agency proceedings that lead to the
issuance of general rules is summarized in Nathanson, supra note 1, at 724-27. The
legislative analogy was relied upon to some extent to limit the kind of hearing required by
statute in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933), but
was criticized in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 10, at 101-02.
119 Cf. Northern Cal. Power Agency v. Morton, 396 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Northern Cal. Power Agency v. Kleppe, 539 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Department of Interior rules affecting utilities serving more than 200,000 persons).
120 Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 460 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (district court trial
required when agency proceedings held inadequate).

72:83 (1977)

Development and Diversification

may also lead to decisions
that similar rights arise by implication under
12 1
particular statutes.
Nathanson has cogently demonstrated that the complex of significant
procedural requirements, some of which allow room for flexible application according to agency discretion, contained in the Administrative
Procedure Act when rule making must be on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing, 12 2 could be held applicable more often than it has
been. 123 By that means, comparatively definite statutory prescriptions for
some, but not all, aspects of agency procedure in formulating binding
substantive regulations would apply in additional instances of agency rule
making. The alternative adopted by the Supreme Court, 124 of restricting
the on-the-record requirement to instances in which statutes clearly impose it, confines the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for
rule making to the notice-and-response process and the prescriptions for
publication and judicial review, leaving additional requirements, if any,
to be derived from other sources. Aside from the due process source
already mentioned and the specific statutory provisions previously summarized, other sources are (1) implied requirements of applicable statutes
and (2) implied prerequisites to available judicial review. 125 Even under
Nathanson's alternative, these sources need to be drawn upon as to
procedures not explicitly covered by the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act which he would invoke.
Implied statutory requirements applied by judicial decisions to agency proceedings have dealt particularly with the agency obligation to give
121 The decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), which held that
deportation hearings were required to be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act now contained in 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 and 557 (1970), with a
hearing examiner (now. called Administrative Law Judge) presiding, seems to this writer to
have rested on the ground that an opposite interpretation of the Immigration Act gave rise to
serious due process issues, rather than on a square holding that due process would otherwise
be denied. See 339 U.S. at 50-51. The effect of the decision was largely overcome by a later
statute which was sustained. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); L. JAFFE & N.
NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 709 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON]. Either view sustains the argument of Nathanson,
supra note 1, at 730, 739.
122 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
123 Nathanson, supra note 1, at 725-33.
124 United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
125 As to this aspect of judicial review, see Verkuil, JudicialReview ofInformalRulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Verkuil]; Wright, Court of Appeals
Review of Federal Agency Rulemaking, 26 AD. L. REV. 199 (1974), and The Courts and the

Rulemaking Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974); Note,
The JudicialRole in Defining ProceduralRequirementsfor Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 782 (1974). See also Pederson, FormalRecords and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE
L.J. 38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pederson]; Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the
Administrative ProcedureAct: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 401
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
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26
with the
adequate notice of the substance of proposed regulations;'
adequacy of agency disclosure, during the procedural stage prior to the
issuance of regulations, that information or issues were being con128
sidered; 127 with rights of response to evidence or of cross-examination;
or with the adequacy of agency statements accompanying the issuance of
29
rules. 1

Requirements as to agency procedure which arise as implied prereq-

uisites to judicial review depend on the scope of the examination of an
agency's action which a court is required to undertake. The Administrative Procedure Act now provides the basic formula governing the scope of
judicial review, 130 which, however, may be varied by other statutes.
Within that formula, the developing prerequisite is a sufficient indication
by the agency that it has given adequate consideration to all relevant
3
factors pressed upon it or set forth in the governing statute. ' The basis
126 The question most often litigated in this connection is whether the initial published
notice gave an adequate indication that particular aspects of the proposed regulations, which
later were considered, would arise. See, e.g., National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train,
539 F.2d 775, 779-82 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 534
F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 1635 (1977).
127 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Department of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (4th Cir. 1976);
Texaco, Inc. v. FEA, 531 F.2d 1071 (Emer. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 656 (Ist Cir. 1974); Logansport
Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954). On the basis of a
practical judgment as to whether the needed information had actually been conveyed, the
agency was sustained in each of the cases cited in this and the preceding footnote except the
Maryland case. The South Tenninal proceeding was remanded for other reasons. The
question of adequacy of notice relates closely to that of the adequacy of presentation by the
agency of factual material bearing on variant issues, with opportunity for other participants
in the proceeding to respond. Cf. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 417 F.
Supp. 1364 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (FDA Commissioner's use of materials in promulgation of food
preparation regulation held adequate because, although the industry was not notified which
particular sources were used, the sources were available publicly).
128 Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
539 F.2d 824, 838-39 (2d Cir. 1976); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d
775, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975); American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d
718 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
129 AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying a special statutory
requirement of specific reasons for action); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Public Service Comm'n v.
FPC, 511 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(relating to statutory requirement of specific findings).
130 See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
131 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280, slip op. at 48-52 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25,
1977); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Alabama Power Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 383
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (Fahy, J., dissenting); Public Service Comm'n v. FPC, 511 F.2d 338 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (applying a statutory requirement of full statement,
including reference to data relied on); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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for this evaluation is the agency's conduct in admitting and excluding
material offered by participants, in making its own contributions to the
"record" or file, and in its statement accompanying the final regulation.
The precise means by which compliance with this requirement of due
consideration is to be achieved and demonstrated to a reviewing court
remain largely in the discretion of the agency,132supplemented by requirements which a reviewing court may impose.
Some statutes which do not provide for regulations to be based on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing provide at the same
time that a reviewing" court shall set a regulation aside if substantial
evidence to support it or its factual foundation is lacking. 133 Whether
"substantial evidence" in this context means anything more than a
sufficient evidentiary or factual base for rational conclusions, such as is
required in any event, is not certain; 1 34 but it should suffice for such a
base to be provided in reliable form, by whatever formal or informal
means. 135
THE UTILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The ramifications of the scope of judicial review of agency actions,
including regulations, prescribed by the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, have been well explored so often 136 that a further attempt at analysis
132 Pederson, supra note 125, supplies an informed and thoughtful set of suggestions to
agencies. See also the illuminating discussion in Williams, supra note 125.
133 See, e.g., the Occupational Safety & Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970), discussed
and applied in Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975). Additional statutory provisions to the same effect
are listed in Verkuil, supra note 125, at 218 n.150, and in Hamilton, supra note 82, at 131926.
134 See Pederson, supra note 125, at 48-51, and the comments of Judge Friendly on a
variety of statutory "substantial evidence" provisions relating to review of regulations in
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1973), cited in
Nathanson, supra note 1, at 761 n.182. But cf. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (McGowan, J.), cited in Nathanson, supra
note 1, at 761 n.182, differentiating fact determinations from policy decisions in relation to
the substantial evidence test.
135 Strictly speaking, as well as traditionally, substantial evidence relates to findings of
fact and consists of evidence formally entered into a record; but with respect to rule making
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970), not required to be "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing," a far wider range of recorded data, often relating to broader conclusions of
fact as well as to policy, is embraced by the term. See Verkuil, supra note 125, at 203-06,
210-15.
136 See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 204-38 (1976), and the exhaustive treat-

ments of the subject in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546-623
(1965), and 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 114-270 (1958 & Supps. 1970, 1976).

Differences continue among judges over how to apply the established formulas for the
scope of judicial review to complex technological determinations. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976), provides a striking illustration. The reason lies partially in the different nature of scientific fact (often probability)
determination from that of ordinary legal determinations of fact or of causation. See Gelpe
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here would serve no useful purpose. The need to elicit adequate information from an agency concerning its consideration of regulations and the
factual foundation for them, to serve as a basis for review, has been
alluded to.' 37 Variations in this respect in different kinds of review

proceedings, including receipt of evidence in court concerning agency
operations, have been discussed recently by Nathanson in his latest
article, 138 as well as by other writers. 139 The immediate need at this point
is to consider the role of judicial review in (1) affecting the policies which
emerge in agency regulations or, occasionally, in decisions not to issue

rules and (2) procuring adherence by agencies to the interwoven political,
investigative and auditory policy-making processes which are prescribed
for them.
The basic principle as to the proper allocation of functions for

shaping policy is clear: within statutory limits, the discretion to develop
policy is in the agency, not in the reviewing courts which, accordingly,
are not to substitute their views for those of the agency, properly reached
and grounded.1'° Arbitrary and capricious action, excesses of authority
and abuses of discretion are, however, to be held invalid; 141 and, in some
instances, actions not supported by sufficient evidence (which might for
this reason also be arbitrary and capricious) 142 are likewise to be invalidated. Included in arbitrary and capricious action or abuse of discretion is action that has been taken without adequate consideration of
& Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in EnvironmentalDecisionmaking,48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 371 (1974). Significant applications of judicial review to regulations which involve
the kinds of questions alluded to, as well as an important issue of statutory law, are involved
in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S.
112 (1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 1597 (1977).
137 See text accompanying notes 131-35 supra.
138 Nathanson, supra note 1.
139 Currie & Goodman, supra note 113, at 41-50; Verkuil, supra note 125, at 212-14;
Williams, supra note 125, at 413-25.
140 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 74 (1975); Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 371-72 (1973); Florida Sugar Cane League,
Inc. v. Usery, 531 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1976); Cities Serv. Co. v. FEA, 529 F.2d 1016 (Emer.
Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d
506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). See the discussion of the necessarily
limited role of the courts with relation to esoteric scientific matters in Union of Concerned
Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974). When rule making disposes of issues that
otherwise would be subject to trial-type adjudication in future proceedings, there is especially strong reason why judicial review should be sufficiently intensive to test the validity
of the outcome. See City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
141 See, e.g., National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the FRS, 516 F.2d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1975); National Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers & Distrib. v. FCC, 502 F.2d
249 (2d Cir. 1974).
142 For an application of this view, see South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 66365 (lst Cir. 1974).
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factors which, under the governing legislation, are required to be taken
into account, 43 such as the economic impact of safety precautions or of
pollution control standards.
The crucial determinations the courts must make on review of
regulations dealing with complex subjects are often subtle and difficult.
The courts' approach determines whether, on the one hand, a necessary
corrective to agency misfunctioning is being applied or, on the other
hand, a court is usurping, or at least impeding, the policy-making function. Different observers will judge the same instances differently; and
overall evaluations must relate to particular courts during specific periods
of time. The use of a judicial check seems necessary, however, in order,
inter alia, to afford remedies to persons injured by legally invalid action
and to vindicate the public interest in avoiding arbitrary action and to
secure the benefit of judicial determination of such underlying issues of
law as what factors the governing legislation permits or requires the
agency to consider.
It is relevant to mention here the spur to legally mandated agency
action which judicial review has in some circumstances come to apply,
and the corrective to improper influences upon an agency which the
courts at times can provide, even as to rule making. Both relate to the
operation of political factors which, if not counteracted, can paralyze or
distort the policy making with which agencies are entrusted. Hence, an
agency may sometimes be required to develop regulations which it has a
statutory duty to issue for the benefit of persons who have access to the
courts, but lack other means of inducing agency action. 144 With respect to
improper influences, although the Administrative Procedure Act's safeguards against ex parte communications with agency decisional personnel
have until now extended only to adjudication,1 45 there seems to be a
growing disquietude that personal pressures by legislators or by interested
groups to secure particular results could, nevertheless, under exceptional
circumstances invalidate an agency regulation, standard or general authorization. 146
143 See, e.g., Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297
(D.D.C.), affl'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Morton, 393 F.
Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975).

144 See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971) (duty of the Secretary of the
Interior to regulate traders on Indian reservations).

145 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), (d) (1970). Section 4 of the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5
U.S.C.A. § 557(d) (Supp. IV 1976), effective March 12, 1977, adds a new subsection to 5

U.S.C. § 557 (1970), which forbids ex parte communications with interested persons outside
an agency to or by any official "who is or reasonably may be expected to be involved in the
decisional process," in any proceeding on the record after opportunity for a hearing,

whether adjudicatory or rule-making in nature. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 557(d)(1)(A), (B), (C) (Supp.
IV 1976).
146 In Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
a rule assigning a television frequency to a community was held to have been vitiated by ex
parte communications to Commissioners by the applicant in a closely linked licensing
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It is true that the kind of judicial spur to legally mandated agency
action which has been mentioned could easily impose severe burdens on
the courts and seriously invade the area of official discretion as to when
and how to use limited agency resources. However, the limitations of
standing to bring proceedings against officials, coupled with appropriate
judicial restraint, should establish effective safeguards against the imposi-

tion of undue burdens on agencies. On the other hand, judicial checks
against improper efforts to influence rule making seem hardly workable
or even proper. In rule making, the agency is free to seek relevant data
and views wherever they may be found, with the duty to disclose the
bases of its actions which have been discussed. Judicial invalidation of a
regulation on the ground that a particular undisclosed improper influence
had been brought to bear would rest, not upon failure to disclose pertinent
grounds of agency action, but upon an ethical judgment that particular
communications should not have taken place. Such judgments do not
seem feasible. Fear of precipitating them, moreover, might tend to choke
proceeding. However, later proceedings sufficiently removed the stigma to permit the same
allocation to be made. See the same case at 294 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Fort Harrison
Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 324 F.2d 379 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
See also W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1012-18
(6th ed. 1974); L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, supra note 121, at 688-94. As to pressure from a
Senator, see Texas Medical Ass'n v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
The decision in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, No. 75-1280 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 25,
1977), which has become available since the foregoing text was written, applies the Sangamon Valley principle to a situation in which unrevealed ex parte communications between
interested persons and the Commission took place after the scheduled rule-making proceedings were closed and before the resulting regulations were issued. These communications,
rather than the data and reasoning recorded in the open rule-making proceedings, appeared
to have heavily influenced the outcome. Their full substance and import were not recorded
and could not be made available to the court. The subject matter involved intensely
competitive, large-scale economic interests as well as important public interests. Finding
violation of the Commission's procedural regulations by the ex parte communications, slip
op. n.122, as well as a need by the court for enlightenment from "adversarial discussion
among the parties," slip op. at 91, the court enunciated a requirement that, if ex parte
contacts occur, "any written document or a summary of any oral communication [received]
must be placed in the public file established for each rule-making docket immediately after
the communication is received so that interested parties may comment thereon." Slip op. at
98. Recommendation 74-4 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of General Applicability, 1 C.F.R. § 305.74-4 (1977),
cited by the court, slip op. at 98-99, recommends to the same effect with regard to factual
information considered by an agency. In the case itself the court ordered further agency
proceedings, including opportunity for all parties to the former proceedings to participate, in
order to produce a full report to the court concerning the previous ex parte communications.
Slip op. at 100.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act applies the safeguard of open meetings to the
operations of the mainly helpful participation of such bodies in all kinds of agency action.
As to whether the Act applies to discussions with private groups which an agency consults,
compare Food Chem. News, Inc. v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1974), with Consumers Union v. HEW, 409 F. Supp. 473,476 (D.D.C. 1976). See also Nader v. Baroody, 396 F.
Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.D.C. 1975).
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off desirable agency resort to relevant data and opinion. In this connection the integrity of legislators and agency personnel and the watchfulness
of reporters and other unofficial observers must probably remain a principal means of securing agency performance which is faithful to high
governmental standards. Maintenance of an adequate public file in pending rule-making proceedings, informal as well as formal, in which all
pertinent communication between the agency and outsiders would be
recorded, would provide an additional safeguard which agency action or a
statute might well require.
CONCLUSIONS

In the continuum of legal means by which social purposes are
effectuated through government, the phase which involves agency rule
making, as it has here been described, seems certain to endure. Its details
will continue to require attention, adaptation to particular purposes and
even across-the-board improvement as experience and changing
philosophies of government may dictate; but the more general planned
combination of policy-making processes which it offers is essential in a
democracy under modern conditions. 147 Rule making provides a regularized opportunity for politically active persons and groups interested in
particular matters to participate, giving them a legitimate outlet and
making available to government their information and views. It gives a
central place to investigation by specialists into specific problems, providing neutral data and solutions derived from expertise. It draws frequently on auditory procedure and judicial review, establishing safeguards against abuse or deficiencies, undergirding responsiveness to
legislatively prescribed ends, and securing the rationality of the resulting
regulations. Better means of discharging a vast range of governmental
functions, as determined by legislation, have not been suggested. Indeed,
resort to these means has taken place at an increasing rate, under legislative majorities and executive incumbencies of differing political complexions.
Current proposals for reducing the need for agency processes in149
volve the simplification of welfare 148 and federal-aid determinations
and the "deregulation" of segments of the economy now subject to
governmental controls. 150 There may indeed be a need for some such
147 See Linde, supra note 4, where the discussion contains a realistic appraisal of the
roles and inter-relationships of legislatures, agencies, and courts in policy formulation. See
also Freedman, Review: Delegationof Power and InstitutionalCompetence, 43 U. Cm. L.

REV. 307 (1976); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 372
(1976).
148 Le., cash grants to beneficiaries who meet specified requirements.
149 Le., conditional "revenue sharing" with state and local governments.
150 See, e.g., Colloquium: The Deregulation of Industry, 51 IND. L.J. 682-755 (1976).
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measures; but for each one that may be adopted, the imposition of other
agency duties seems certain to take its place, both to deal with persisting
economic problems such as unemployment and to cope with new threats
to human health or to the environment. At the moment, even many
scientists interested in so esoteric a research endeavor as recombinant
DNA research wish the public, which will experience the consequences
for good or ill, to share in critical decisions as to what shall and shall not
be done-a sharing which probably would take place through agency
processes. In place of some current instances of prohibitory regulation by
agency rule, such as regulations limiting air or water pollution, governmental monetary charges to inhibit the conduct which is to be discouraged
might be imposed instead of outright restrictions; but the fees to be
charged and the precise conduct upon which they would be levied would
still need to be determined. Frequently, no doubt, agencies would be
called upon to make these determinations.
Improvement of agency and review processes, then, rather than
significant curtailment of their use, offers the one realistic means of
reducing the deficiencies which beset them at present. Stated in general
terms, the means of improvement seem obvious, and their enunciation
seems trite; yet the need for continuous consciousness of them and for
persistent effort to translate them into specific measures justifies a brief
discussion of proposals for change.
With respect to rule making, the current tendency toward increased
use of binding regulations to resolve policy issues seems clearly desirable
because of two main factors. One is that, in rule-making proceedings,
attention is focused on a critical issue or set of issues that will arise later
in specific instances, which can by this process be thoroughly explored in
an atmosphere not charged by the immediacy of a specific case. The other
is that the resulting determinations can be applied, when later need arises,
with little added utilization of procedures.
Such an increase in the use of rule making should clearly not be
carried to the length of subjecting essentially different situations to
simplistic formulas. The danger of this consequence does not arise when
interpretative regulations and general statements of policy (guidelines)
are used instead of binding regulations, provided they remain genuinely
open to agency reexamination when serious questions concerning them
are raised. To avoid misconceptions they should be clearly labeled as
what they are. Although they lack the conclusiveness and high probability
of procedural economy of binding regulations, they can be given increased effectiveness and acceptance if they are formulated with the aid
of informal participatory rule-making procedures, such as a number of
important agencies employ voluntarily at present. Along with internal
regulations and agency handbooks, these general guidelines also tend to
produce responsibility and consistency in agency administration of statutes. Amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act to require the use
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of public procedure prior to the adoption of interpretative rules and
general statements of policy does not seem wise, however, because of the
costliness of the procedural burdens it might impose and the possible
151
discouragement of the use of such pronouncements that might result.
The nature and importance of the interests at stake when binding
regulations are under consideration often require the opportunities to
participate in the rule-making process which the Administrative Procedure Act now typically affords. Some of the exceptions of certain subject
matters, which the Act now contains, are outmoded and should be
abolished. 152 The participatory aspects of the Act's processes can in many
instances validly be confined to written presentations by interested persons after published notice, provided an ultimate agency statement of the
basis and purpose of the regulation follows when the regulation is published, to facilitate decisions as to whether judicial review shall be sought
and to aid in the review process itself.
The reasons for oral hearings and for the addition of some of the
aspects of a judicial trial as features of some agency rule-making proceedings are too numerous and varied to be listed here, but depend largely on
the public or social importance of the issues involved, the intensity of the
interests at stake, and the kinds of facts at issue. It is correct to say, as
often it has been, that information or testimony as to single-instance facts,
such as the experience of an individual or firm under circumstances with
which a regulation may deal, are most appropriately subjected to rights of
rebuttal and even cross-examination. It does not follow that compilations
of more widespread facts, which often are only cumulations of individual
instances, and the reliability of expert testimony concerning them must
forego similar testing. Neither can it be said that particular topics, such as
"rates," call inherently for these incidents of a trial. "Rates" traditionally are charges dependent on investment, return on investment and
competition on which the viability of an enterprise depends, whereas in
the Florida East Coast case, 153 they were payments for the use of
borrowed railroad freight cars, designed to serve as a deterrent to retaining the cars. A need for trial processes as to the one kind of rate does not
establish a need as to the other kind. Practice in these matters should
remain open to agency discretion initially, subject to later judicial check,
with the nature of the subject matter and proposed testimony to serve as
the bases for decision.154 Obviously, agency manuals for officers presiding at hearings would help.
When proceedings involve any of the elements of a contest leading
to determination by a deciding authority, the principle of adequate disclo151See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
152 See note 14 supra.
153 United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
154 For an illuminating discussion of means for determining the need for cross-examination, see Kestenbaum, supra note 89, at 694-709.
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sure of data, contentions and deciding rationale should be determinative
of several aspects of the procedure employed. An agency statement of
proposed rule making which sufficiently reveals what is contemplated;
timely disclosure of relevant material generated by the agency or received
from others, adequate in content and arrangement to facilitate appropriate
responses; and a statement by the agency explaining in rational fashion
the grounds of its regulation are important in these circumstances. The
product is then likely to receive, as well as to merit, the confidence of
interested persons and the deference which courts traditionally pay to
agency determinations and must continue to be able to pay if the system is
not to break down.
Adherence to these and other elements of good rule-making processes is, of course, no guarantee of good results, much though it may
contribute to them. A great deal will continue to depend on other factors
which, on the whole, are more fundamental. One factor is wellconsidered statutory provisions that (1) set forth clear directives as to
policies within which an agency is to operate and (2) contain procedural
prescriptions that are well suited to aiding the agency to formulate clear
subordinate rules. The recent legislation reviewed above with respect to
procedural prescriptions is in some instances unduly restrictive. As to
policy prescriptions, the legislation is frequently quite definite and clear,
but sometimes too rigid and demanding to be carried out successfully.
These prescriptions result from a laudable effort to forestall interest group
pressures that might defeat agency attainment of statutory goals, or to
avoid the opposite evil of provisions that are so vague or conflicting as to
leave agencies without effective guidance.
The introduction of public participation into agency rule-making
proceedings under minimal notice-and-response procedures, or more especially the addition of auditory processes, can be looked upon as enlarging the political aspects of policy making by encouraging interest groups
armed with procedural rights to come forward, especially when the
bestowal of those rights by statute results from a prolonged legislative
battle.' 5 5 Since the political factors are inherently present and will remain, the question is not whether they will be operative as the rulemaking agency proceeds, but whether they shall operate wholly informally, often behind the scenes, or shall be regularized and subjected to the
controls and checks which the recent influx of investigative and auditory
processes was expected to provide. The latter alternative seems clearly
preferable in many situations.
Another alternative would be for the legislature to reassert its authority more fully by itself enacting detailed rules in place of leaving many of
them to agencies which all too often become the captives of interest
155 Such is the view indicated by the title, but hardly the substance, of Professor Nelson's
helpful article, The Politicizationof FTC Rulemaking. Nelson, supra note 89.
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groups instead of serving the public ends laid down for them. At the
agency level, "interest group liberalism," which seeks to distill policy
from the interplay of contending forces, is said to have failed-as indeed
it has in many instances.1 56 Yet it seems erroneous to maintain that,
whatever ideals of law individuals and groups may rightly subscribe to for
themselves, governmental policy can be shaped in the long run by other
purposes than those which reflect a balance of the ideas and interests
(economic and noneconomic) of those persons in society whose desires
count-which in a democracy means everyone who is willing and able to
come forward. Agency rule making must continue to reflect these ideas
and interests in specialized operations, to the large extent that agency
policy-making processes must still be drawn upon. The best that these
processes-or any governmental processes-can do is to cast strongly
into the balance those forces of vigilance, rationality and objectivity of
decision which agency rule making is designed to reflect.
The quality of the policies developed by government agencies, as by
other institutions, turns largely in the end on the competence and character of the individuals who make decisions and on the climate of opinion
that surrounds them than on the processes they employ. These aspects of
public administration turn on other factors than those here consideredon methods of personnel selection and management, especially the qualifications and training to be sought and cultivated, on the character of the
nation's official and unofficial leadership, and on the changing aspirations of society. 157 Unless these matters are well attended to, the better
structuring of processes cannot produce great improvement of results. It
can, nevertheless, contribute significantly to successful government if the
other elements of statesmanship are present.
156 See generally T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). The procedural ramifications

and difficultiesof judicial review in the present system are well discussed in Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
157
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